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WHO FRAMED ROBERT DEVEREAUX? DEVEREA UX V.
PEREZ, A DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD, AND




George Burroughs was a minister who had dedicated his life to
helping the less fortunate.' He was also a victim of the Salem
witchcraft hysteria of the late seventeenth century.' In April 1692,
Ann Putnam, one of the girls being tortured by the "witches" of the
town, told her father that she had seen the specter of a minister, who
had tried to get her to sell her soul to the devil.3 The minister told her
that his name was George Burroughs, that he was a conjurer, and that
he had killed two of his wives by bewitchment, in addition to having
killed two other people. 4 Ann's father, Thomas Putnam, a prosecutor
in the witchcraft trials, took Ann's deposition of the above claims and
had her sign it.,
His daughter's accusations were just what Putnam needed. He
and the other prosecutors were looking for a man, mentioned by
several of the afflicted girls, who was a leader in the Satanic rituals
and who, if found, would "cause a commotion of such vast magnitude
that the people would believe anything that was put before them."' 6 A
week later, the magistrate issued an arrest warrant for Burroughs and
the marshal promptly arrested him.7 At Burroughs's hearing, the
afflicted girls had fits and accused Burroughs of crimes such as
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2002. The author
wishes to thank Dean Harold Krent for his guidance and insight and Mark Brookstein for his
valuable editing.
1. See GEORGE MALCOLM YOOL, 1692 WITCH HUNT: THE LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO THE
SALEM WITCHCRAFT TRIALS 53-54 (1992).
2. See id. at 54-55.




7. See id. at 55.
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leading a witch's meeting in a field.8 In August 1692, the prosecutors
brought Burroughs to trialY During the trial, the afflicted girls put on
a great commotion and twisted Burroughs's incredible feats of
strength against him, using them to show his relationship with the
devil."' The court found Burroughs guilty, and on August 19, 1692,
Burroughs and four other prisoners were hanged on Gallows Hill."
Besides the tragic ending, Burroughs's story is not that different
from that of Robert Devereaux three centuries later. 2 Instead of
being a victim of the Salem witchcraft hysteria, Robert Devereaux
was a victim of the Wenatchee, Washington child abuse hysteria. 3 In
this hysteria, public officials wrongly charged Devereaux and about
forty other adults with over 29,000 counts of child sexual molesta-
tion. 4 The officials charged and arrested Devereaux on the basis of
evidence just as tenuous, flimsy, and unbelievable as that which the
seventeenth-century prosecutors used to convict and hang George
Burroughs. Unlike the Burroughs case, however, the officials
ultimately dropped all of the charges against Devereaux and released
him.
5
Child sexual abuse is unquestionably a serious contemporary
social problem. Another serious problem, however, is the response
by officials to allegations of child sexual abuse, which has been
compared to the witch-hunts of the seventeenth century. 6 In many
cases, as Robert Devereaux's case exemplifies, this comparison is,
unfortunately, all too accurate. Overzealous prosecutors and social
workers often prosecute defendants who may be innocent in an
attempt to rid the world of child sexual abuse offenders. 7 Much of
the danger of such overzealousness on the part of state officials can
8. See id. at 59-60.
9. See id. at 106.
10. See id. at 107.
11. See id. at 107, 114-15.
12. See Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2000).
13. See id. at 1047-50.
14. See id. at 1050.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., RICHARD A. GARDNER, SEX ABUSE HYSTERIA: SALEM WITCH TRIALS
REVISITED (1991).
17. See Matt O'Connor & Kim Barker, Judge Rips DCFS Probes: System Ruled
Unconstitutional, CHI. TRIB., April 3, 2001, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.
com/chicagotribune/ (discussing a ruling by U.S. District Court Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer which
stated that the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services' system for investigating
allegations of child abuse and neglect is unconstitutional and that it has "too often led to false
accusations of wrongdoing against child caretakers").
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be attributed to the way in which prosecutors and other child sexual
abuse investigators can manipulate and coerce child witnesses during
interrogations of the children.,8 Because of children's vulnerability,
immaturity, and impressionability, the manner in which investigators
interview children has a direct effect on their credibility, and the use
of improper investigatory techniques can make children's statements
about abuse unreliable.19 As the New Jersey Supreme Court has
stated, "[t]hat an investigatory interview of a young child can be
coercive or suggestive and thus shape the child's responses is gener-
ally accepted."20
Prosecutors and other officials have great opportunity to ma-
nipulate children's statements during child sexual abuse interroga-
tions. If officials take advantage of this opportunity, defendants
charged with abuse could be wrongfully convicted. Thus, the way in
which officials interview children in sexual abuse cases has serious
due process implications.2 2  By impeding the search for truth in
litigation, the pretrial interviewing of children can violate a defen-
dant's due process rights.
In Devereaux v. Perez,23 the Ninth Circuit addressed the question
of whether there exists a "constitutional due process right to have
child witnesses, in a child sexual abuse investigation, interviewed in a
particular manner or pursuant to a certain protocol. 24 The court held
that there is no such constitutional right, and thus the doctrine of
qualified immunity protected the defendants from liability.25 The
court reasoned that standards for how child witnesses should be
18. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377 (N.J. 1994).
19. See id. at 1376-79; see also TERENCE W. CAMPBELL, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE
DEVASTATING EFFECTS OF FALSE SEXUAL ABUSE CLAIMS 61 (1998) ("Rather than carefully
identify the circumstances surrounding how an allegation developed, [professionals assessing
allegations of sexual abuse] immediately proceed with interviewing the child premised on what
they think they know. Approaching interviews in this manner leads professionals into
committing one blunder after another, and quite frequently, these blunders so severely
contaminate the entire investigation that they cannot be corrected.").
20. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377.
21. Id.
22. See Clifton M. Dugas, 11, Note, State of New Jersey v. Michaels: The Due Process
Implications Raised in Interviewing Child Witnesses, 55 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1223 (1995) ("A due
process fairness question clearly arises in the context of suggestive interview techniques.
Regardless of one's personal position on the degree of tolerance for police impropriety, it is
certain that improperly conducted child interviews can result in unfairness to the accused
individual.").
23. 218 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 1056.
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interviewed in sexual abuse cases are not established clearly enough
to allow for the finding of a right to have children interviewed in a
particular way.2" Although the investigation in the case was "far from
textbook perfect," the court concluded that it was not so "outra-
geous" that it violated traditional notions of due process.27
Part I of this Comment presents the facts of Devereaux v. Perez
and the ruling and reasoning of the Ninth Circuit majority and
dissenting opinions in the case. Part II outlines the background
necessary to analyze the Ninth Circuit's approach to the issue of
whether there was a constitutional violation in Devereaux. It
introduces 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute under which Devereaux
brought suit, and the doctrine of qualified immunity, which the court
in Devereaux used to determine whether there was a violation of a
right and how specifically or generally the right at issue should be
framed. Part III considers the approach the court used in deciding
Devereaux v. Perez and examines two flaws in the court's reasoning
and conclusion. Part III suggests that both the intent standard the
court required in order to show a violation of the right at issue and
the way in which the court framed the right at issue in the case give
too much protection to state officials investigating child sexual abuse
cases and too little protection to those accused of child sexual abuse.
I. DEVEREAUX V. PEREZ
A. Facts
Devereaux v. Perez arose out of several criminal child sexual
abuse charges brought against Robert Devereaux. 28 Devereaux, the
plaintiff, was a foster father caring for a number of young girls.29 In
August 1994, one of Devereaux's foster girls was placed in juvenile
detention because she had tried to poison Devereaux and another
foster girl.30 While in juvenile detention, a police detective, instead of
asking the girl about the attempted poisoning, questioned her about
whether Devereaux had ever sexually abused her.3' The girl denied
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 1050.
29. See id. at 1047.
30. See id. at 1048.
31. See id.
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that Devereaux had abused her, but later recanted and stated that he
had.32 The next day she was interviewed by a social worker and said
that the police detective had pressured her into accusing Devereaux
the previous day and had made her lie.33 At a subsequent interview
the child stated that the police detective "'make[s] all the children
lie"' and again insisted that Devereaux had not raped her.34 The
police detective then threatened the girl with criminal prosecution if
she recanted her previous testimony that Devereaux had raped her.35
After this threat, the girl stated that her exculpatory statements about
Devereaux had been a lie.3
6
Officials interviewed several other foster children under
Devereaux's care and all of these interviews followed the same basic
pattern.37 When first questioned by detectives and social workers, the
girls would deny ever having been sexually abused by Devereaux.38
However, after being subjected to extensive questioning and outra-
geous interviewing techniques, the girls would recant their denials
and state that Devereaux had abused them.3 9 The investigators
repeatedly refused to accept the girls' denials of abuse. 4°
One of the girls, who had repeatedly denied that Devereaux had
ever sexually abused her, was held at the police station for six hours,
until 11:00 P.M., when she finally stated that Devereaux had abused
her.4' Later, she admitted that she made this statement "only because
she was 'sick and tired' of being interrogated."42 Yet another foster
girl, who also repeatedly denied having been sexually abused by
Devereaux and denied having seen him abuse any of the other girls,
was removed from Devereaux's home and placed in the home of the
detective working on the case.43 Seven months later, while still living
at the detective's house, she "changed her story."" She claimed that






37. Id. at 1048-50, 1058 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1048-49, 1058 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1048-49, 1058-59 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 1048-49.






sex orgies in many different locations and implicated, among others,
her parents, siblings, grandparents, neighbors, cab drivers, Salvation
Army employees, other children, and Devereaux. 5 These incredible
assertions provided the basis for some of the child molestation
charges against Devereaux. 46
According to the dissent in Devereaux, the above examples are
only a few illustrations of the coercive, threatening conduct that
investigators used with many of Devereaux's foster girls.47 Further-
more, in addition to employing these highly improper interview
techniques in the case against Devereaux, the investigators also
withheld from Devereaux and his counsel the exculpatory statements
made by the foster girls in the interviews. 48
Officials arrested Devereaux multiple times and charged him
with numerous counts of rape of a child, child molestation, and
tampering with a witness.49 After an investigation, with the charges
against Devereaux pending for over a year, all of the charges against
him were dropped pursuant to a plea agreement in which Devereaux
pled guilty to one count of rendering criminal assistance and one
count of fourth degree assault for having spanked one of his foster
girls.50 The district court decided that the charges were dropped
because of lack of evidence.5
Devereaux then brought suit against the investigators under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that they had violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights by manipulating and coercing the foster girls to
give false evidence against him and by withholding and ignoring
exculpatory evidence.5 2  The US District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington granted summary judgment for all of the
defendants. 5 3 Devereaux then appealed the district court's dismissal




47. Id. at 1058-59 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1049-50 nn.5-6, 8.
49. Id. at 1049-50.
50. Id. at 1050.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1047, 1050-51.
53. Id. at 1051.
54. Id.
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B. Ninth Circuit Opinion
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision and dismissed Devereaux's suit, concluding that the defen-
dants were entitled to qualified immunity.55 Qualified immunity
protected the defendants because, as the court determined,
Devereaux failed to show that the defendants violated a constitu-
tional right that was sufficiently established so that a reasonable
official would understand that a due process right had been violated.
56
The court declared that "there is no constitutional due process right
to have child witnesses, in a child sexual abuse investigation, inter-
viewed in a particular manner or pursuant to a certain protocol."57 In
its decision, the court admitted that the record revealed an investiga-
tion "which was far from textbook perfect," but stated that "[t]he
constitutional dimensions of investigatory techniques employed to
discover child sexual abuse are simply not clearly established. ' 58 In
support of its holding, the court cited to several federal circuit courts
of appeals decisions, all holding that improper interviewing of child
witnesses in sexual abuse cases does not give rise to a due process
violation. 5
9
According to the court, Devereaux's asserted right to have child
witnesses interviewed in such a way as to avoid leading questions or
influencing the children was too vague and abstract-it was a
"nebulous, unconstrained abstract constitutional right" that would
give rise to the basically unqualified liability of officials. 60 Further-
more, the court concluded that the evidence Devereaux presented
was also too general and insufficient to support his claim that he was
deprived of any particularized due process right.61
The court did concede that state officials investigating child sex-
ual abuse cases may be held liable for violations of "cognizable
constitutional rights. '62  According to the court, there is a well-
established right to be free from the knowing use of false or perjured
55. Id. at 1053-54, 1057.
56. Id. at 1053.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1056.
59. Id. at 1053-54 (citing Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993); Doe v. State of
Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1993); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1992); Stem v.
Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1990); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987)).
60. Id. at 1054.
61. Id. at 1054-55.
62. Id. at 1055.
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evidence in a criminal prosecution. 63 However, the court determined
that this constitutional right had no application to the instant case
because there was no evidence that the defendants knowingly
presented false evidence to be used to prosecute Devereaux. 64
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld argued that a defendant
has a constitutional right not to be "framed," that state officials
should know about this right, and that Devereaux presented sufficient
evidence to show that the defendants deliberately coerced the child
witnesses to give false statements in order to prosecute him.65 The
dissent emphasized the principle that an official will not be protected
by qualified immunity just because the specific action in question has
not been held unlawful by prior case law.66 The majority, Judge
Kleinfeld asserted, ignored this rule and essentially held that in order
for it to have found a constitutional violation, there must be prior
case law establishing that the way in which the defendants inter-
viewed the child witnesses in the instant case violated a due process
right.67
According to the dissent, the court should have focused on the
question of whether the defendants violated Devereaux's right to due
process by acting in a way that reasonable people in the defendants'
position would have realized violated an established right. 6  Any
reasonable official, the dissent concluded, would know that a
defendant has a right not to be framed or have fabricated evidence
used against him, but the defendants in the case knowingly coerced
the child witnesses to lie in order to prosecute Devereaux.
69
II. THE DEFENSE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO SECTION 1983
CLAIMS
Section 1983 is one of the most commonly used causes of action
to redress deprivations of federal constitutional rights by government
officers. Section 1983 holds "every person" acting under color of
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1056.
65. Id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1059 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1061 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1061-62 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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state law liable for depriving any other person in the United States of
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws."7" To recover damages against a government official under
section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a constitutional right
exists, that the defendant violated that right under color of state law,
and that the defendant's acts proximately caused the plaintiff's
injury.7' In addition to fulfilling these three requirements, to succeed
under a section 1983 claim the plaintiff must "maneuver" around a
significant "barrier" to recovery, the doctrine of qualified immunity.72
Qualified immunity is a defense to civil rights claims brought
under section 1983.13 "[I]t stands as a legal principle defined primarily
by the Court's own policy judgment that an individual's right to
compensation for constitutional violations and the deterrence of
unconstitutional conduct should be subordinated to the governmental
interest in effective and vigorous execution of governmental policies
and programs. 74  The Supreme Court first acknowledged the
qualified immunity defense in Pierson v. Ray,75 where it held that the
defense of good faith and probable cause is available to police officers
in a section 1983 action.76  The current statement of the qualified
immunity standard is described in Harlow v. Fitzgerald77 and
Anderson v. Creighton.
7 8
In Harlow, the US Supreme Court reformulated the qualified
immunity doctrine, abandoning the subjective portion of the qualified
70. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
71. Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 270-71 (1995).
72. Id. at 271 ("In addition to establishing the violation of an existing constitutional right,
the plaintiff must also maneuver through an elaborate maze of constitutional remedies doctrine
that imposes substantial barriers on the road to recovery. Among the most important of these
barriers is qualified immunity.").
73. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
74. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 36 (1989).
75. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
76. See id.
77. 457 U.S. 800.
78. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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immunity test that it had established in Wood v. Strickland and
articulating an objective inquiry. 79 The Court held that "government
officials performing discretionary functions[] generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." 81 The purpose of this new,
solely objective test was to "avoid excessive disruption of government
and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary
judgment."'" The Court also noted, however, that by framing the
qualified immunity standard in objective terms, it was not providing
any "license to lawless conduct": "The public interest in deterrence of
unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected
by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an
official's acts. '82 The Harlow Court's reformulation of the qualified
immunity test into a purely subjective inquiry "demonstrates the
Supreme Court's increased sensitivity to the costs to defendants of
defending against § 1983 litigation,[] at the same time showing the
Court's reduced concern for the financial and psychological costs to §
1983 plaintiffs of conducting such litigation. '" 3
In Anderson v. Creighton, the Court "adopted a more fact-
specific approach to the objective qualified immunity test" and
continued its movement in a "prodefendant direction."' The Court
stated in Anderson, "The contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right. 8 Qualifying this statement, however, the
Court noted, "This is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously
been held unlawful.., but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing
law the unlawfulness must be apparent. '86
The Supreme Court made clear in Wilson v. Layne that when
evaluating a qualified immunity claim, the court must first decide
79. See Harlow. 457 U.S. at 818 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 819.
83. 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW
OF SEcTION 1983, at 8-16 (4th ed. 2001).
84. Id. at 8-35, 8-37 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)).
85. 483 U.S. at 640.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
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whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right.,,
If the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right,
then the court must determine whether the right was clearly estab-
lished at the time of the violation."' Generally, "the answer to the
question of whether the right was clearly established will be a
function of how narrowly the 'contours' of the particular right are
drawn when framing the inquiry.","
The Supreme Court has articulated several rationales for using
qualified immunity to shield public officials from section 1983
liability.91 One justification for qualified immunity is alleviating the
''social costs" to individual defendants and government of claims
brought against innocent officials. 91 "These social costs include the
expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office."92 This justification illustrates the Court's belief that
qualified immunity is "necessary to screen out constitutional tort
claims that might burden individual defendants and the government
with resource-consuming litigation.
'93
Another reason for protecting public officials with qualified im-
munity is the over-deterrence rationale: "the danger that fear of being
sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.' ' ' 4 This rationale seeks to prevent the situation in which "a
public official faced with a decision that could subject her to constitu-
tional tort liability would, like a deer caught in the headlights, be
inhibited from taking necessary action." 95 A third reason for applying
87. 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); see also Baker v. McCollan. 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979) (stating
that the first step when analyzing a section 1983 claim is to "isolate the precise constitutional
violation with which [the defendant] is charged."); Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A
User's Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 199 (1993) (stating that to meet the first prong of the
qualified immunity test, the plaintiff must assert a "violation of a constitutional right under the
law as presently construed").
88. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609: see also Blum, supra note 87, at 199-200 (stating that to
satisfy the second part of the test, the plaintiff must "prove that the law regarding this right was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct").
89. Blum, supra note 87. at 200.
90. See Chen, supra note 71, at 273 ("[T]he Court has identified three distinct policy
justifications for qualified immunity ... fairness, overdeterrence, and litigation burdens.").
91. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see also Chen. supra note 71, at 275-76.
92. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814; see also Chen, supra note 71, at 276.
93. Chen. supra note 71, at 276.
94. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (citation omitted). See also Chen, supra note 70, at 275.
95. Chen, supra note 71. at 275: see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). In
Rhodes. the Court stated:
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qualified immunity to government conduct is based on fairness
concerns.96 It is unfair to subject government officials to liability for
actions that do not clearly violate constitutional rights.97 Further-
more, public officials, who "regularly face situations that require
them to evaluate the application of some existing structure of law to
new circumstances" 98 should not have to "predict[] the future course
of constitutional law." 99
III. THE USE OF A DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD AND A
RIGHT NOT TO BE FRAMED IN DEVEREAUX V. PEREZ
The majority in Devereaux v. Perez made two major errors,
which led to its unjust dismissal of Devereaux's case. First, the
majority erred in demanding too high a level of culpability. Accord-
ing to the majority, for Devereaux to have succeeded on his claim
against the defendants, he would have had to show that the defen-
dants knowingly used false evidence against him. The court was
wrong to require a "knowing" intent level, instead of a lower, more
plaintiff-friendly standard, such as deliberate indifference. Second,
the majority defined the right at issue in the case too narrowly. The
court wrongly focused on a right to have children interviewed in a
certain way, instead of defining the right at issue more broadly as the
right "not to be framed," , or a defendant's constitutional right not to
have evidence fabricated against him and used to deprive him of his
liberty. " 1
[Olne policy consideration seems to pervade the [immunity] analysis: the public
interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws for the protection of the
public.... Public officials... who fail to make decisions when they are needed or who
do not act to implement decisions when they are made do not fully and faithfully
perform the duties of their offices. Implicit in the idea that officials have some
immunity-absolute or qualified-for their acts, is a recognition that they may err. The
concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some
error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all.
Id. at 241-42.
96. Chen, supra note 71, at 273-75.
97. See id. at 273.
98. Id.
99. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
100. Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
101. Note that because Devereaux's constitutional claim was dismissed on summary
judgment, see supra p. 906, the truthfulness of the facts as alleged by Devereaux was never
determined in a court of law. Thus, the author is assuming for purposes of the arguments made
in this Comment that the facts as alleged by Devereaux, see supra Part LA, are true.
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A. The Intent Standard
The first error made by the court in Devereaux relates to the in-
tent standard employed by the court. The majority in Devereaux,
citing the Supreme Court case Pyle v. Kansas as authority, acknowl-
edged that there is a constitutional right to be free from the knowing
use of false evidence in a criminal case."" Because there was not
sufficient evidence to show that the defendants in Devereaux
knowingly fabricated evidence in order to prosecute Devereaux, the
court concluded that this constitutional right did not apply in the
instant case. 103
The dissent apparently had no problem with this "knowing"
standard imposed by the majority. Indeed, the dissent's disagreement
with the majority's conclusion on this issue stemmed not from the fact
that the court used a "knowing" standard, but rather from the
majority's finding that there was no evidence that the defendants
knowingly deprived Devereaux of the right not to have evidence
fabricated against him.1 4
Although the dissent was correct in concluding that there was
sufficient evidence that the defendants deliberately fabricated
evidence against Devereaux, Judge Kleinfeld was wrong, as was the
majority, in applying the "knowing" intent standard. In child sexual
abuse cases, where the interrogation of child witnesses is in question,
such a standard is too high and gives too much protection to state
officials. Although the state has an important interest in protecting
children from sexual abuse, it also has a significant interest in
protecting defendants from officials who "[m]anufactur[e] false
102. See Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1055 (citing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)). In Pyle,
the Court concluded that the knowing use of false or perjured testimony to convict a defendant
and the deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence by officials constituted a deprivation of
constitutional rights. See 317 U.S. at 216.
103. See Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1056. The majority inappropriately glossed over the
question of whether there was evidence that the defendants knowingly fabricated evidence
against Devereaux. Instead of analyzing the evidence before it to determine whether the
defendants knowingly framed Devereaux, the court simply made a conclusive and dismissive
statement that "[t]he record before the court does not reveal any evidence giving rise to an
inference that the Individual Defendants knowingly presented false evidence to be used in
Devereaux's sexual abuse prosecution." Id. As the dissent pointed out, there was ample
evidence to show that the defendants deliberately manufactured evidence, and the majority
erred in ignoring this evidence. See id. at 1062 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
104. See id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). The dissent correctly argued that the evidence
presented by Devereaux clearly showed that the defendants deliberately fabricated evidence




evidence and us[e] the criminal law system to ruin the lives of
innocent people.... The seriousness of a crime never justifies
manufacturing evidence and convicting the innocent."" 5 In child
sexual abuse cases, where the techniques employed by state officials
to interview children are at issue, the standard required to prove a
violation of the defendant's due process right to not have evidence
fabricated against him should be lower than a "knowing" standard.
1. Supreme Court Discussion of Intent Standard in Due Process
Cases
In Daniels v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause is not implicated by lack of due care of an official who
unintentionally causes injury to life, liberty, or property.1"  More
simply stated, a state official cannot be held personally liable for a
due process violation if he is merely negligent in causing the depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property. 17 In its opinion, the Court reasoned
that traditionally, the due process guarantee has been invoked in
cases where officials deliberately deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property."8 This tradition reflects the principle that the Due Process
Clause was "'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government."' "I Thus, simply a lack of due
care on the part of the official (as opposed to an abuse of power)
"suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a
reasonable person" and "[t]o hold that injury caused by such conduct
is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law.'"
Thus, as is clear from the holding in Daniels, state officials' mere
negligent fabrication of evidence by coercing child witnesses would
not trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause. This result is
consistent with the state's interest in protecting children from sexual
abuse and in not inhibiting officials' investigations of alleged abuse.
The Court in Daniels, however, did not consider whether something
105. Id. at 1063 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
106. See 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). The Court reaffirmed this holding in Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
107. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31 (overruling only the part of the Court's prior decision in
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). that held that mere negligence is enough for a deprivation
of property).
108. See id.
109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 332.
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less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence,
would be enough to invoke due process protection."' In his dissent in
Davidson v. Cannon, Justice Brennan wrote, "[O]fficial conduct
which causes personal injury due to recklessness or deliberate
indifference, does deprive the victim of liberty within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.""' 2 Such a recklessness standard would
be appropriate in child sexual abuse cases like Devereaux because it
would sufficiently preserve the state's interest in protecting children
from sexual abuse, officials' interest in being able to conduct child
interviews free from the inhibiting fear of personal liability, and
defendants' interest in not having officials fabricate evidence against
them by coercing child witnesses.
2. A Deliberate Indifference Standard
The Supreme Court has employed a deliberate indifference stan-
dard in prison-conditions cases"3 and in cases involving the Freedom
of Speech and Press Clauses. A comparison of these cases with
Devereaux v. Perez demonstrates how and why the deliberate
indifference standard applies to Devereaux."4
In Farmer v. Brennan, an Eighth Amendment prison-conditions
case, the Supreme Court defined the term "deliberate indifference"
and the test for it. ' ,' "[Dieliberate indifference entails something
111. See id. at 334 n.3.
112. 474 U.S. 344, 349 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. For a discussion about the applicability of the "objective reasonableness" test of
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), described above, to constitutional claims of
deliberate indifference, see Rudovsky, supra note 74, at 57 ("Where the constitutional claim
requires proof of intentional misconduct or a similarly high level of culpability, the notion of
'objective reasonableness' may be irrelevant. Thus, an eighth or fourteenth amendment claim
of 'deliberate indifference' to an inmate's medical needs ... should not be subject to an
immunity defense. Once the plaintiff proves intentional or deliberately indifferent conduct, the
official could not have acted reasonably.").
114. The relationship of the deliberate indifference standard in the context of prison-
conditions cases to Devereaux, a due process case, may not be as tenuous as it first appears.
Discussing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), Sheldon H. Nahmod notes that "[s]ince
deliberate indifference or reckless disregard also turns out to be the due process standard in a
majority of the circuits, Farmer v. Brennan may be relevant to § 1983 actions based on the due
process clause." 1 NAHMOD, supra note 83, at 3-72 n.1.
115. See 511 U.S. at 835-40. According to the Court in Farmer, the term "deliberate
indifference" first appeared in the United States Reports in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976). See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. In Estelle, the Court clarified that Eighth Amendment
violations involving medical care require deliberate indifference by prison officials to a
prisoner's serious illness or injury. See 429 U.S. at 104. Other Eighth Amendment prison cases
employing the deliberate indifference standard include: Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35
(1993) (affirming the circuit court's holding that the plaintiff inmate stated a cause of action
under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that the defendants had, "with deliberate
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more than mere negligence ... [but] is satisfied by something less
than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result."' 6 The courts of appeals, as noted in
Farmer, usually equate deliberate indifference with recklessness. 17 In
determining the level of culpability required for deliberate
indifference, the Court in Farmer rejected an objective test for
deliberate indifference in favor of a subjective test."8 This subjective
test is consistent with recklessness in criminal law, which requires that
a person disregard a risk of harm about which he has knowledge." 9
The Court in Farmer ultimately held:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confine-
ment unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. 120
Thus, to act recklessly or with deliberate indifference in the con-
text of the Eighth Amendment, "a person must 'consciously
disregar[d]' a substantial risk of serious harm."'' However, the Court
added that the concept of constructive knowledge could be applicable
indifference, exposed him to levels of ETS that pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage
to his future health"); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (holding that the Estelle
deliberate indifference standard is applicable to cases alleging inadequate conditions of
confinement); La Faut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[wihether
one characterizes the treatment received by [the plaintiff] as inhumane conditions of
confinement, failure to attend to his medical needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate
to apply the 'deliberate indifference' standard articulated in Estelle to this case").
116. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. A standard higher than deliberate indifference is used in one
type of prison cases: when officials are accused of using excessive force. See id. at 835-36. In
such cases, the prisoner must show that officials used force "maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). This heightened standard is applied because in these cases, where
prison officials are acting in response to a disturbance, the decisions of the officials are
"necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second
chance." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). Thus, in these emergency situations, a
higher standard is used to protect the defendants who have necessarily acted quickly and
without a lot of time to think about their actions. Comparing these emergency situation cases to
Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2000), demonstrates that it is inappropriate to apply
such a heightened intent standard to cases such as Devereaux. Devereaux did not involve an
emergency situation like that of the prison cases, in which officials must act in a split second.
The defendants in Devereaux, although probably under pressure, had a lot of time (in
comparison to prison officials acting in response to a prison disturbance) in which to think about
their actions while conducting their investigation of Devereaux.
117. See 511 U.S. at 836.
118. See id. at 837.
119. Seeid. at837.
120. Id. at 837.
121. Id. at 839 (citing Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c)).
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to deliberate indifference so that deliberate indifference "would not,
of its own force, preclude a scheme that conclusively presumed
awareness from a risk's obviousness.' ' 22 Thus, a fact finder may
determine that a prison official knew of a substantial risk based on
the fact that the risk was obvious.
23
This subjective deliberate indifference (or criminal recklessness)
standard applicable to prison-conditions cases should be applied to
cases such as Devereaux v. Perez. 24 The purpose of this standard, as
discussed in Estelle v. Gamble, is to protect prisoners from the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by officials,125 who may
perhaps be characterized as overzealous. Prisoners do not deserve
punishment above and beyond incarceration, such as the denial of
needed medical care or the refusal to protect prisoners from violence
by other prisoners. 26 Similarly, in Devereaux and other child sexual
abuse investigation cases, the person being charged with child abuse
needs protection from overzealous officials investigating the allega-
tions of abuse. In both the prison cases and the child abuse investiga-
tion cases, the officials taking care of the prisoners or investigating
the allegations of abuse may be inclined to "go overboard," and
indeed, easily have the opportunities to do so because of their
positions of authority, and either inflict more punishment than is
deserved, or, in the context of sexual abuse investigations, use highly
questionable and unconstitutional means to elicit accusations. In the
prison cases, officials may be likely, and have the opportunity, to
inflict cruel and unusual punishment because of their positions of
power over the prisoners and the perception that the prisoners are in
jail because in many instances they have committed horrible wrongs
and do not deserve humane treatment. Likewise, in the child abuse
cases emotions run very high, and because child abuse is a particularly
horrific crime, it is easy for investigating officials to become
overzealous in their attempts to protect innocent children. 121 Because
122. Id. at 840.
123. See id. at 842.
124. 218 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2000).
125. 429 U.S. 97, 102-05 (1976).
126. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-34; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-05.
127. In addition, prosecutors can derive several benefits from the aggressive and diligent
prosecution of suspected child sexual abuse offenders, regardless of whether the suspects are
actually innocent. First, prosecutors may garner positive press in the media, enhancing and
advancing their careers and reputations. This incentive may well have played a role in the case
brought against Devereaux, as the police detective who led the investigation against Devereaux
was newly appointed and the case against Devereaux was his first child sexual molestation case.
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of these parallels between Eighth Amendment cases and child abuse
investigation cases like Devereaux, it is appropriate to apply the
deliberate indifference standard articulated in Farmer v. Brennan to
Devereaux in order to protect the accused.
Applying the Farmer subjective deliberate indifference standard
to Devereaux demonstrates that the defendants in Devereaux were
deliberately indifferent to Devereaux's right not to be framed, or not
to have evidence fabricated against him and used to deprive him of
his liberty. Under the deliberate indifference standard, the defendant
must have consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious
harm. 2" There is sufficient evidence in Devereaux that the defendants
consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to
Devereaux by the way in which they conducted the interviews with
the foster girls. The defendants threatened, manipulated, and
coerced the girls into making false accusations against Devereaux. 12 9
They would not accept the girls' exculpatory statements, they did not
record or inform Devereaux of the exculpatory statements, and they
interrogated at least one of the girls for six hours, until she finally
implicated Devereaux just so that the defendants would release her.
130
Furthermore, the defendants believed incredible accusations that
Devereaux and a multitude of others had regularly engaged in group
sex orgies with one of the girls and had abused the girl, despite
medical evidence that proved that the girl was not sexually active.'
3'
As the dissent noted,
The repeated pattern is that the child says Devereaux did not sexu-
ally abuse her or anyone else, and then one or more of the defen-
dants ... take the child into custody and subject her to extensive
interrogation, calling her a liar when she sticks to her exonerating
story, and letting her go only when she changes her story to accuse
Devereaux. Sometimes the coercion is a threat of prosecution.
Sometimes it is long isolation and interrogation late at night. For
all the children, subjecting them to the psychological discomfort of
hours of sex talk itself could be taken to be coercion, where there
was little apparent factual basis for it.
32
See Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1063 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). In addition, their zeal in finding and
convicting alleged offenders may have the effect of deterring potential child sexual abuse
offenders, thus potentially making prosecutors' jobs easier.
128. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839.
129. See 218 F.3d at 1048-50; see also id. at 1057-59 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 1048-50; see also id. at 1057-59 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 1050; see also id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1058-59 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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In light of this behavior by the defendants, it is clear that the de-
fendants consciously disregarded the risk that by using such outra-
geous interrogation techniques, Devereaux would be falsely accused
of child sexual abuse, arrested, and repeatedly deprived of his liberty.
Moreover, the risk of having evidence fabricated against Devereaux
and falsely accusing him of sexual abuse was so obvious that a fact
finder could very well conclude that the investigating officials knew of
the risk and thus violated the deliberate indifference standard.133
The US Supreme Court has also employed a subjective approach
to recklessness in the context of the Free Speech and Press Clauses.
3 4
In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, a candidate
for a judgeship in Ohio filed a libel action against a local newspaper
that had published a story in which false allegations about the
candidate were made. 35 The Court discussed the "actual malice"
standard applicable to public figure libel cases: the public figure must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published
the false and defamatory statement with actual malice. 136 "Actual
malice" means the statement was made either with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard for the truth.37 The Court held
that the reckless disregard standard in a defamation action is subjec-
tive, requiring that "'the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication," 38 or that "the defendant actually
had a 'high degree of awareness of... probable falsity."" 39 Signifi-
cantly, the Court noted that in a case involving the reporting of a
third party's allegations (as in the case before it), "'recklessness may
be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports."' 4
An examination of the reason why the Court uses a subjective
reckless disregard standard in public figure libel actions highlights
several parallels between Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. and
Devereaux v. Perez which show that the reckless disregard standard
employed in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. (and other public
133. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
134. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
135. 491 U.S. 657, 660 (1989).
136. See id. at 659 (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80).
137. See id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80).
138. Id. at 688 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731).
139. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).
140. Id. (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732).
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figure libel cases) should be applied to Devereaux and cases like it.141
Underlying the Court's rule that public figures in libel cases must
show the false statement was made with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard for its truth is the concern that "[f]alse
statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the
truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause
damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by
counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.' ' 42  These same
concerns are present in cases like Devereaux, in which someone is
charged with a crime like child sexual abuse. The false accusations
against Devereaux, which were procured only through the investiga-
tors' use of coercive and very questionable interviewing techniques,
are just as valueless as false statements about an individual printed in
a newspaper or magazine. In addition, the use of blatantly outra-
geous interrogation techniques by the investigators in Devereaux
clearly interfered with the truth-seeking function of the judicial
system, just as the publication of the false statements in Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. interfered with the truth-seeking function of
the marketplace of ideas. In fact, interference with the judicial system
is arguably more serious than interference with the marketplace of
ideas, as the primary function of the judicial system is to find the truth
and carry out justice.
Injury to reputation is another danger with which both libel cases
and child sexual abuse cases are concerned. The false allegations of
child abuse against Devereaux manufactured by the defendants are
certainly at least as injurious, if not more so, than the false statements
about the judicial candidate published in Harte-Hanks Communica-
tions, Inc. A charge of child sexual abuse is not an allegation that is
quickly forgotten and carries with it a serious stigma. For people who
have always worked with children and are wrongly accused of child
sexual abuse, such an allegation, even though groundless, can plague
them for the rest of their lives and could very well prevent them from
ever working with children again. Indeed, in its sentencing of
Devereaux (after all of the sexual abuse charges against him were
dropped), the state court prohibited Devereaux from having contact
with some children, from being a foster parent for two years, and
141. Note that the subjective reckless disregard standard in the context of libel actions
applies to nongovernmental conduct, while Devereaux and other cases brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 deal with conduct by government officials.
142. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (citation omitted).
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from working in an area that provides services to or has regular
contact with minor children.
143
Furthermore, not only was Devereaux's reputation forever dam-
aged, but also he was wrongly deprived of liberty during his several
arrests. This possibility in child sexual abuse cases of the wrongly
accused being thrown in jail is not present in the libel cases, and thus
suggests that officials like the defendants in Devereaux, who manipu-
late children and fabricate evidence, deserve even less protection than
defendants who publish false statements. If a public figure in a libel
action only has to satisfy a reckless disregard standard to prevail in his
case, a person like Devereaux whose reputation likewise was at stake
and whose liberty was actually taken away when he was arrested
should not have to satisfy a higher standard than public figures in libel
cases.
Moreover, there are several factual similarities between Harte-
Hanks Communications, Inc. and Devereaux which demonstrate that
if the Ninth Circuit had applied such a reckless disregard standard in
Devereaux, the defendants would have clearly been in violation of it.
First, Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. is much like Devereaux in
that the outrageous way in which the defendants interviewed the child
witnesses in Devereaux effectively led to a kind of defamation of
Devereaux. A defendant newspaper printing information when it has
serious doubts about the truth of that information is parallel to the
defendants in Devereaux using the false accusations they coerced
from the foster girls against Devereaux to charge him with child
sexual abuse. In both situations, the defendant is using information,
the truth and accuracy of which is highly questionable, to harm
another person.
There are several more specific factual similarities between the
two cases. In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., the judicial
candidate himself and five other witnesses had denied the false
charges against the candidate before the defamatory story was
published.14 Furthermore, as the Court noted, the most serious
charge against the judgeship candidate was "highly improbable" and
"inconsistent" with facts known by the newspaper before it published
the story. 45 The newspaper also failed to listen to tapes that the
judgeship candidate made available to it (before the publication of
143. See Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000).
144. See 491 U.S. at 691.
145. Id.
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the defamatory story) that would have discredited the accusations
against the candidate published in the story.146  Characterizing the
defendant newspaper's actions (and inaction) as "a product of a
deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might
confirm the probable falsity of [the charges against the candidate]"
and as "the purposeful avoidance of the truth," the Court concluded
that the plaintiff satisfied the actual malice standard.
47
The defendants' actions in Devereaux closely resemble the de-
fendant's actions in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. Devereaux
himself denied the child abuse allegations against him and almost all,
if not all, of the foster girls in his care at least at some point in their
interviews denied that Devereaux had engaged in any abuse. 14  Also,
like one of the charges against the candidate in Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc., several of the allegations against Devereaux
were highly improbable 149 and inconsistent with other facts.50 Similar
to the defendant newspaper's failure to listen to the exculpatory tapes
before printing the story in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., the
defendants in Devereaux refused to accept the exculpatory statements
that the foster girls made and in fact failed to record, and even
concealed, these statements.'5' These actions by the defendants in
Devereaux, like those of the newspaper in Harte-Hanks Communica-
tions, Inc., can be characterized as "the purposeful avoidance of the
truth."
Application of the reckless disregard standard articulated in
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. to Devereaux warrants the
conclusion that the defendants in Devereaux recklessly disregarded
146. See id. at 692.
147. Id. at 692-93.
148. See Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1048-50.
149. For example, one of Devereaux's foster girls claimed (seven months after being placed
in the home of the detective who was investigating Devereaux and in contradiction to her
statements before she was placed in the detective's home) that almost every night Devereaux
would participate in group sex orgies with her, other children, her grandparents, aunts, uncles,
siblings, and many others, during which Devereaux and other adults would sexually abuse the
children. See id. at 1049. Based on this interview, Devereaux was charged with additional
counts of child molestation. See id.
150. For example, one of the foster girls, C.M., indicated that Devereaux and others had
sexually abused her, and that her mother knew about the abuse. See id. at 1050. In a
subsequent interview with C.M.'s mother, the mother stated that she had abused C.M. and other
children and that she, Devereaux, the minister of her church, and several other people had
participated in group sex orgies. See id. However, a medical doctor who later examined C.M.
concluded that C.M. was not sexually active because her hymen was still intact. See id. This
medical evidence directly contradicted the allegations of sexual abuse by C.M. and her mother.
151. See id. at 1048-49.
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the truth of their accusations against Devereaux. The defendants in
Devereaux threatened and manipulated the foster girls into accusing
Devereaux of sexual abuse.12 These outrageous techniques that the
defendants used when interviewing the children are ample evidence
that the defendants charged Devereaux with sexual molestation and
arrested him with a high degree of awareness that the charges against
him were false. Thus, the defendants violated the reckless disregard
standard set forth in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.'53
B. Framing the Right at Issue
The majority's second error in Devereaux v. Perez is the way in
which it framed the right at issue in the case. The court defined the
right too specifically, and thus incorrectly concluded that the defen-
dants did not violate a constitutional right.
1. The Level of Generality or Specificity at Which the Right Should
Have Been Defined
The court framed the right involved in the case as the "right to
have child witnesses, in a child sexual abuse investigation, interviewed
in a particular manner or pursuant to a certain protocol.1154  By
describing the right at issue as a right to have children interviewed in
152. See id. at 1048-50; see also id. at 1057-59 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
153. Additional support for applying a deliberate indifference standard in child abuse
investigation cases like Devereaux comes from the Supreme Court's holding in Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In Franks, the Court found a reckless disregard standard
applicable to statements made by police officers in support of a search warrant. See id. at 155-
56. It held that when a defendant in a criminal proceeding shows that a government official
"knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth" made a false statement
which was necessary to the finding of probable cause and then included that false statement in a
warrant affidavit, the search warrant must be voided. See id. (emphasis added). The Court in
Franks did not specifically address the use of a reckless disregard standard in the probable cause
context. However, the fact that in order to establish a violation of the right not to be arrested or
prosecuted without probable cause a defendant only has to show that the officer procuring the
warrant affidavit made a false statement with reckless disregard for the truth, see Soares v.
Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1993), supports the argument that a deliberate indifference
(or reckless disregard) standard should be applied to child abuse investigation cases. The
probable cause cases in which defendants have successfully challenged the veracity of the sworn
statements in warrant affidavits are similar to Devereaux. In the probable cause cases, the
officers have used false statements to procure search warrants, and in Devereaux, the officials
used false statements to charge Devereaux with child sexual abuse and deprive him of his
liberty. In the probable cause cases and in Devereaux, the government officers used false
statements to deprive victims of their constitutional rights-in the probable cause cases, the
actions of the officers deprived victims of their Fourth Amendment rights, while in Devereaux,
the defendants' actions deprived Devereaux of his Fourteenth Amendment right not to have his
liberty taken away without due process of law.
154. Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1053.
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a particular manner, the court framed Devereaux's violated right
much too narrowly.55
The US Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Creighton, addressed the
question of how generally or specifically a constitutional right should
be defined. 5 6 In considering whether an FBI agent who participated
in an illegal search may be held liable if a reasonable agent could
have believed that the search was legal, the Court stated that
"whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally
turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action.., assessed
in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it
was taken."' 57
The operation of this "clearly established law" test depends, ac-
cording to the Court, to a great extent on "the level of generality at
which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be identified.'1 8 For instance, if
the relevant constitutional right is defined as the right to due process
of law, the notion of qualified immunity would become meaningless
because every state official is reasonably aware that such a broad
right exists. 59 The constitutional right in such a case is defined much
too generally, and "bear[s] no relationship to the 'objective legal
reasonableness' that is the touchstone of Harlow."'6  Thus, the
155. Because it framed the right so specifically, the court was probably correct when it
concluded that there is no established due process right to have child witnesses in a child sexual
abuse case interviewed in a certain manner. See id. at 1053. Indeed, the court cited several
federal circuit court decisions all rejecting the proposition that improper interviewing of child
witnesses in sexual abuse cases may constitute a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation
or, more specifically, a violation of a right to family integrity. See id. at 1053-54. However, in
State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994), the supreme court of New Jersey suggested that due
process concerns may be implicated by an improper investigation of child witnesses in a child
sexual abuse case. See id. at 1380. After concluding that the interviews of children in that case
were "highly improper and employed coercive and unduly suggestive methods," the court
recognized the due process rights of the defendant:
This Court has a responsibility to ensure that evidence admitted at trial is sufficiently
reliable so that it may be of use to the finder of fact who will draw the ultimate
conclusions of guilt or innocence. That concern implicates principles of constitutional
due process.... If crucial inculpatory evidence is alleged to have been derived from
unreliable sources due process interests are at risk.
Id. (citation omitted). For an analysis of the Michaels case and an argument that constitutional
due process protections should be applied to the way in which child interviews are conducted,
see Dugas, supra note 22.
156. 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
157. Id. at 639 (citations omitted).
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Id. (referring to Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
[Vol. 77:901
WHO FRAMED ROBERT DEVEREAUX?
constitutional right allegedly violated must be defined more specifi-
cally:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reason-
able official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by quali-
fied immunity unless the very action in question has previously
been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing
law the unlawfulness must be apparent.'
6'
The Court in Anderson was careful to emphasize that this fram-
ing of the underlying constitutional right does not involve examina-
tion of the official's subjective intent: "The relevant question in this
case ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a
reasonable officer could have believed [the defendant's] warrantless
search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the
information the searching officers possessed.'
' 62
In deciding whether the contours of the right have been defined
at an appropriate level of specificity, courts usually examine prior
case law. 163 However, it is not necessary that the court find a prior
case with the very same facts as the case before it to hold that the
official violated a clearly established right. 4  To the contrary,
qualified immunity does not protect state actors when preexisting law
provided the official with "'fair warning' that his conduct was
unlawful."'165 In other words, for a right to be clearly established, "the
law must have defined the right in a quite specific manner, and ... the
announcement of the rule establishing the right must have been
unambiguous and widespread, such that the unlawfulness of particu-
lar conduct will be apparent ex ante to reasonable public officials."' 6
In light of the Supreme Court's discussion in Anderson of the
level of generality or specificity at which a constitutional right should
be defined, it is clear that the majority in Devereaux framed the right
at issue in the case too specifically.167 The Supreme Court stated in
Anderson that the very action in question does not have to have
161. Id. at 640 (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 641.
163. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).
164. Id. (citations omitted).
165. Id. (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1997)).
166. Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 116 (1st Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
167. Another way to state this criticism is to say, as did the dissent, that the majority made
an excessive demand for specificity by requiring that there be prior case law which spells out the
proper way for social workers and other public officers to interview children in sexual abuse
cases. See Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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previously been held unlawful in order for there to be a violation of a
clearly established constitutional right.6, However, by framing the
right in question as the right to have children interviewed in a
particular manner in sexual abuse cases, the majority was effectively
saying that the way in which the officials interviewed Devereaux's
foster children must have previously been held to be a constitutional
violation in order for the court to find that the officials in Devereaux
violated a constitutional right.6 9 As the dissent stated, the majority's
propositions, on which it bases its decision, that there are no cases
holding that there is a constitutional right to have child witnesses
interviewed in a certain way and no established standards for
interviewing child witnesses, "beg[] the question of whether a
constitutional right has been clearly established by the case law, and
phrase[] the test in positive terms that ensure that the test of specific-
ity will never be satisfied."70
The dissent used a helpful example to illustrate the fact that the
majority framed the right too narrowly. The dissent cited a hypo-
thetical case (which was originally articulated in a Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals dissent and subsequently cited by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Lanier171) involving the sale of foster children into
slavery by welfare officials.171 If such a case arose, the welfare
workers could argue that there is no case prohibiting welfare officials
from selling foster children into slavery.' 73 However, it is clear that in
such a situation the absence of any case law regarding the selling of
children into slavery would not justify the imposition of qualified
immunity. 174
168. See 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). See also the dissent in Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1059-60,
which stated that qualified immunity "does not grant government officials immunity if they
engage in action that a sensible person would realize was unconstitutional, even though there is
no case on all fours that holds the conduct to be unconstitutional," and "[t]hus, it is clearly
established that absence of a case in point does not necessarily entitle social workers to qualified
immunity."
169. Interestingly, the majority cited the statement in Anderson that the very action in
question does not have to have been previously held unlawful in order for the constitutional
right to be established. See Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1052-53.
170. Id. at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
171. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
172. See Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1060 (Kleinfeld. J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 1060-61 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 1061 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); see also McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292,
295 (7th Cir. 1992) ("It would create perverse incentives indeed if a qualified immunity defense
could succeed against those types of claims that have not previously arisen because the behavior
alleged is so egregious that no like case is on the books.").
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As in the hypothetical case just discussed, the defendant social
workers in Devereaux apparently argued (and the court accepted this
argument) that because there is no case prohibiting officials from
interviewing children in the way in which Devereaux's foster children
were interviewed, Devereaux had not established the violation of any
constitutional right. In arguing this, however, "the social workers
demand more specificity than they are entitled to."' 75  The court
unfortunately agreed with the defendants' argument and demanded
too much specificity, as is apparent by the overly narrow way in which
it defined the constitutional right at issue.
176
By demanding excessive specificity, the court basically elimi-
nated the possibility of any state official ever being held liable for a
violation of a defendant's due process right because of the way in
which the official conducted child interviews, regardless of the
outrageousness of the official's interviewing techniques, until there is
case law providing instructions on how children are to be interviewed
in sexual abuse cases. Indeed, one could even go so far as to argue
that the majority eliminated the possibility of a state official ever
being held liable in such a situation because, as the dissent noted,
there will probably never be a case telling officials how to interrogate
children in sexual abuse cases as "judicial decisions ordinarily do not
write methodology guides for various kinds of public officials."', 7
Furthermore, "[w]hat should be uppermost" in the "clearly set-
tled law" inquiry after Anderson v. Creighton is "one of the purposes
of the qualified immunity defense: fairness to potential defendants
who should not have to predict constitutional law developments."'76
This concern with fairness to defendants, however, is not an issue in
Devereaux, since the defendants did not have to predict any constitu-
tional law developments to realize that coercing the foster girls into
making false accusations against Devereaux and then using those
175. 218 F.3d at 1061 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
176. Rather ironically, the majority asserted that Devereaux's claimed right to have children
interviewed in such a way as to avoid leading questions or influencing the children was "such a
generalized legal right as to 'convert the rule of qualified immunity.., into a rule of virtually
unqualified liability simply by alleging [a] violation of extremely abstract rights."' Id. at 1054
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). The majority further stated that "[t]he evidence relied
upon by Devereaux is so general and unavailing that it would create a nebulous, unconstrained
abstract constitutional right." Id. The majority perhaps mistakenly relied on its finding that
Devereaux's evidence is too general and vague in deciding that the right at issue was too
generalized and hence not clearly established.
177. Id. at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
178. 2 NAHMOD, supra note 83, at 8-57.
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fabricated statements to charge Devereaux with sexual abuse is
unconstitutional. Despite the fact that, as the majority noted, "[t]he
constitutional dimensions of investigatory techniques employed to
discover child sexual abuse are simply not clearly established,"'' 79 any
reasonable official investigating child abuse would know that coercing
child witnesses to lie violates the suspect's right not to be framed and
not to have evidence fabricated against him and used to deprive him
of his liberty.,' The defendants in Devereaux had "fair warning" that
their conduct was unlawful, and therefore qualified immunity should
not have shielded them from Devereaux's claim.
2. Ways to Frame the Right at Issue
The majority could have and should have framed the constitu-
tional right in question in Devereaux in broader terms. As the dissent
argued, the majority should have defined the right allegedly violated
as a defendant's right not to have false charges fabricated against him,
or the "right not to be 'framed."""' This right can also be stated as
Devereaux's constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty
(Devereaux was in jail for substantial periods on false charges of
raping children) without due process of law, or his right not to have
evidence fabricated and used to initiate proceedings against him.
8 2
As the dissent noted, Devereaux provided evidence that the defen-
dants coerced the foster girls into accusing Devereaux of sexual
abuse, and from this evidence, it can be inferred that the defendants
knew they were obtaining false evidence against Devereaux. 8 3
Indeed, the techniques the defendants used to force the children into
179. Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1056.
180. See id. at 1061-62 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1057, 1061-62 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
182. See id. at 1061-62 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("It is established law that when a
government official coerces a witness to provide what the government official knows is false
evidence against a person, to be used in a criminal prosecution, the official violates the due
process rights of the person against whom the false evidence is to be used."); see also Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (holding that "perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State
authorities to obtain [petitioner's] conviction" and "deliberate suppression by those same
authorities of evidence favorable to [petitioner]" violated the Constitution); Ricciuti v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that "[l]ike a prosecutor's knowing use of
false evidence to obtain a tainted conviction, a police officer's fabrication. .. of known false
evidence works an unacceptable 'corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.'
When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a jury's decision and forwards
that information to prosecutors, he violates the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial, and
the harm occasioned by such an unconscionable action is redressable in an action for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." (citations omitted)).
183. See Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1060-61 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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making the accusations against Devereaux were so suggestive and
manipulative that it is very difficult not to make the inference that the
defendants knew exactly what they were doing, namely, coercing
children to lie in order to support sexual abuse allegations against
Devereaux. 184
The court in Devereaux could have also framed the right at issue,
as did the Second Circuit in a case very similar to Devereaux, as "the
right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of
evidence by a government officer acting in an investigating capac-
ity."' 85 In Zahrey v. Coffey, the Second Circuit held that there is a
clearly established right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the
fabrication of evidence by a government official. 6 The plaintiff in
Zahrey brought suit against several police officers and prosecutors for
conspiring to manufacture false evidence to be used against the
plaintiff in criminal and police disciplinary proceedings.87 The
defendants allegedly influenced and bribed witnesses to fabricate
false accusations and ultimately testify against the plaintiff.'- For
example, the defendants promised a federal grand jury witness, in
order to get her to testify against the plaintiff, that they would assist
her in finishing a drug rehabilitation program, help her obtain custody
of her children, and provide financial assistance to enable her to move
to a new residence.189 After this witness testified against the plaintiff,
the defendants procured the witness's early release from the drug
rehabilitation program and assisted her in moving to a new resi-
dence.' ° A grand jury indicted the plaintiff on several charges and
the plaintiff was arrested.191 Almost a year later, a jury acquitted the
plaintiff of all the charges.1 92 Upholding the plaintiff's claims against
the defendants, the Second Circuit noted that the plaintiff had alleged
a "classic constitutional violation: the deprivation of his liberty
184. For example, one of the foster children was threatened with the filing of charges for
false reporting when she claimed that Devereaux had not raped her, in contradiction to her
earlier statement that he had. See id. at 1048. Another foster girl repeatedly denied that
Devereaux had sexually abused her until finally, at 11:00 P.M., after six hours of interrogation,
she stated that Devereaux had sexually abused her. See id. at 1048-49. She later said that she
had made this allegation only because she was "'sick and tired' of being questioned. Id.
185. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 344, 349 (2d Cir. 2000).
186. Id. at 344.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 345-46.
189. Id. at 345.
190. Id.




without due process of law.[] The liberty deprivation is the eight
months he was confined.., and the due process violation is the
manufacture of false evidence."'' 3
The court in Devereaux could have and should have framed the
right at issue in the case, as did the Second Circuit in Zahrey, as the
right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of
evidence by a government official. The defendants in Devereaux, like
the defendants in Zahrey, wrongly influenced witnesses to concoct
false accusations against Devereaux, and then used these fabricated
allegations to arrest Devereaux.19 4 Devereaux, like the plaintiff in
Zahrey, was deprived of his liberty as he was held in jail based on the
defendants' fabricated evidence. 91 Thus, there was also a "classic
constitutional violation" by the defendants in Devereaux: they
deprived Devereaux of his liberty without due process of law. The
deprivation of liberty is the time that Devereaux was confined in jail
and the due process violation is the manufacture of false evidence
against him.
The right not to be deprived of liberty because of the fabrication
of evidence by a government official, or a right not to be framed, as
the Devereaux dissent described it, may also alternatively be stated as
a defendant's right not to have "dubiously" gathered evidence (or
evidence that has been gathered under circumstances which make its
reliability questionable) used against him in a criminal prosecution.
Two cases lend great support to the existence of such a due process
right, although they do not frame the right in such exact words.
Idaho v. Wright, a case involving child sexual abuse, 196 offers
some support. The Supreme Court in this case affirmed the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision that the admission at a mother's trial of
statements her daughter, the alleged victim, made to a pediatrician
violated the mother's rights under the Confrontation Clause.197
The Court noted that the Idaho Supreme Court had concluded
that the pediatrician's failure to videotape interviews with the
193. Id. at 348.
194. See Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1048-50 (9th Cir. 2000). Although the
defendants in Devereaux did not bribe the witnesses, as did the defendants in Zahrey, the
defendants in Devereaux used similar techniques to influence the children and coerce them into
making false accusations against Devereaux, such as threatening them and refusing to accept
their exculpatory statements. See id.
195. See id. at 1049.
196. 497 U.S. 805, 808-09 (1990).
197. Id. at 812-13.
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daughter, the use of blatantly leading questions, the presence of an
interviewer with a preconceived idea of what the daughter should
have been saying, and children's general vulnerability to suggestive
questioning all indicated the potential for the procurement of
unreliable information.," The Court agreed with the state supreme
court's determination that the daughter's statements were not reliable
because of the suggestive way in which the pediatrician conducted the
interviews with the daughter. 9  Although the hearsay rule was a
major factor in this case, the dubious or unreliable nature of the
evidence gathered from the child witness played a role in the Court's
decision that evidence of the child's statements could not be
admitted.
State v. Michaels, another child sexual abuse case, also expressed
concern about the use of dubiously gathered evidence.2 X In fact, the
New Jersey Supreme Court was so concerned about the use of
dubiously gathered evidence in this case that it decided that a hearing
was required to determine whether the improper interrogation of
child witnesses "so infected the ability of the children to recall the
alleged abusive events that their pretrial statements and in-court
testimony based on that recollection are unreliable and should not be
admitted into evidence." 20, The court stated that there was adequate
agreement within the academic, professional, and law enforcement
fields, which has been supported by some courts, "to warrant the
conclusion that the use of coercive or highly suggestive interrogation
techniques can create a significant risk that the interrogation itself
will distort the child's recollection of events, thereby undermining the
reliability of the statements and subsequent testimony concerning
such events.1 22 The court's requirement that a "taint hearing" be
held before the unreliably gathered information be admitted into
evidence prevents any use of such evidence if it is found to be
198. Id.
199. Id. at 813, 826-27.
200. See 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994).
201. Id. at 1380. Such hearings are called "taint hearings." See John E.B. Myers, A Decade
of International Legal Reform Regarding Child Abuse Investigation and Litigation: Steps Toward
a Child Witness Code, 28 PAC. L.J. 169, 175 (1996). Note that the question in State v. Michaels,
namely, whether a taint hearing was required, was a question of state, not federal, law. In
support of its decision that a hearing was required, however, the court cited several US Supreme
Court decisions. See Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1378-82.
202. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1379; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 84, which concludes,
"the research examining the effects of suggestibility on children's memory dramatically
demonstrates: (1) it is quite easy to distort a child's memory via leading and suggestive questions
and (2) once the child's memory is distorted, the child genuinely believes the distortion."
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"tainted" and thus encourages the notion of a defendant's right not to
have evidence that has been dubiously collected used to prosecute
him.
Both Wright and Michaels implicitly, if not explicitly, recognized
a defendant's interest in not having dubiously gathered evidence used
against him and therefore lend support to the existence of such a
right. The majority in Devereaux avoided this issue of unreliably
gathered evidence by hiding behind its conclusion that the standards
for interviewing child witnesses are not established clearly enough to
allow it to find that the way in which the defendants interviewed the
children was improper or that the evidence they obtained was
unreliable.2 °13 The majority's failure to condemn, or even address the
possibility of the use of dubiously collected evidence in the case
against Devereaux leaves the door open for the continued use of
outrageous and unconstitutional child interviewing techniques by
state officials.
The treatment of confessions made under hypnosis and, more
generally, coerced confessions lends further support to a defendant's
right not to have dubiously gathered evidence used against him in
criminal proceedings. One case that expressed concern about the use
of dubiously gathered evidence in the context of confessions made
under hypnosis is Burns v. Reed."" In this case, the plaintiff brought a
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a deputy prosecuting attorney who
authorized, as part of the investigation of the shooting of the
plaintiff's two sons, the interrogation of the plaintiff while she was
under hypnosis." 5  While under hypnosis, the plaintiff made
statements that led the police officers conducting the questioning to
believe that the plaintiff might have shot her sons. (  The defendant
prosecutor later told police officers that they had probable cause to
arrest the plaintiff based on the results of the hypnosis session.2?
)7
After the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to quash the
statements she made under hypnosis, the prosecutor dismissed all of
the charges against the plaintiff.2°18
203. See 218 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000).
204. 44 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 1995).
205. Id. at 525-26.
206. Id. at 526.
207. Id. at 525-26.
208. Id. at 526.
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Although the Seventh Circuit in Burns ultimately determined
that the defendant prosecutor was entitled to qualified immunity
because the right to be free from coercive interrogation in the form of
hypnosis was not clearly established at the time of the events in
question, the court suggested that there may be a right not to have a
confession extracted by means of hypnosis. 2 9 The court stated, "The
plaintiff in [the] case was allegedly subjected while in a vulnerable
and highly suggestible hypnotic state to bullying and intimidation
from the investigative officers, approved (and later concealed) by the
defendant. This is a disturbing scenario that conceivably could skirt
the edges of constitutional propriety."2111 Confessions and statements
obtained under hypnosis certainly qualify as dubiously gathered
evidence, as the Burns court noted:
Hypnosis admittedly suffers from some unique defects-its known
effects include increased suggestibility, a tendency to "confabulate"
or fill in gaps with fictitious details, an inability to sift fantasy from
fact and an unwarranted boost in the subject's confidence in what
he is relating .... Furthermore, subjects of hypnosis report an "ex-
perience of responding involuntarily. '211
Thus, the existence, or even the mere suggestion of the existence,
of a right not to have confessions extracted under hypnosis (and the
Burns trial court's quashing of the plaintiff's statements made under
hypnosis) illustrates the courts' concern with the use of such dubi-
ously gathered evidence.
In support of her contention that hypnosis violated her constitu-
tional rights, the plaintiff in Burns presented case law establishing
that extracting coerced confessions is a constitutional violation.2' 2
The Supreme Court's characterization and treatment of coerced
confessions demonstrates its unease with dubiously gathered evi-
dence. It is well settled that obtaining a confession by either mental
or physical coercion constitutes a constitutional violation and that
coerced confessions cannot be admitted as evidence in criminal
209. See id. at 527, 529.
210. See id. at 527.
211. Id. (citations omitted); see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 59-60 (1987) ("Three
general characteristics of hypnosis may lead to the introduction of inaccurate memories: the
subject becomes 'suggestible' and may try to please the hypnotist with answers the subject
thinks will be met with approval; the subject is likely to 'confabulate,' that is, to fill in details
from the imagination in order to make an answer more coherent and complete; and, the subject
experiences 'memory hardening,' which gives him great confidence in both true and false
memories, making effective cross-examination more difficult."); William G. Traynor, Comment,
The Admissibility of Hypnotically Induced Testimony, 55 TENN. L. REV. 785 (1988).
212. See 44 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1995).
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trials.2 3 For example, in Chambers v. Florida, the Court determined
that government officials coerced the defendants to confess to
committing a crime by, among other acts, repeatedly questioning the
defendants over several days, by intimidating and pressuring the
defendants, and by not allowing the defendants to talk with counsel
or any friends or relatives.21 4 Because the confessions were coerced,
the Court held that the use of the confessions at trial violated the
defendants' due process rights.2 5
Whether the right at issue in Devereaux is framed as the right not
to be framed, the right not to be deprived of liberty because of the
fabrication of evidence by a government official, or the right not to
have dubiously gathered evidence used to deprive one of liberty, it is
clear that the defendants violated Devereaux's right and that the
majority erred in framing the right as narrowly as it did.
21 6
213. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954); see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
307 (1963) ("If an individual's 'will was overborne'[] or if his confession was not 'the product of
a rational intellect and a free will,' his confession is inadmissible because coerced. These
standards are applicable whether a confession is the product of physical intimidation or
psychological pressure and, of course, are equally applicable to a drug-induced statement.");
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284-86 (1936) (holding that the infliction of physical
violence in order to obtain confessions and the use of the coerced confessions to convict the
defendants was a denial of due process).
214. See 309 U.S. 227, 230-35, 238-40 (1940). The techniques that the government officials
in Chambers used to elicit the confessions are very similar to those used by the defendants in
Devereaux (although in Devereaux, the officials were eliciting accusations instead of
confessions). When first interrogated, the foster children in Devereaux all repeatedly denied
that Devereaux had abused them. 218 F.3d 1045, 1048-50 (9th Cir. 2000). Likewise, in
Chambers, over the course of several days all of the suspects consistently denied guilt. See 309
U.S. at 230-35. Because of their failure to procure any accusations or confessions, the officials
in both cases repeatedly questioned the interviewees and threatened and intimidated them. Id.
at 230-32: Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1048-50. In an attempt by the officials to get the interviewees
to break down, the suspects in Chambers were questioned late at night, 309 U.S. at 231-32, as
was at least one of the girls in Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1049
215. See Chambers, 309 U.S. at 239-42.
216. In a case very similar to Devereaux, the US District Court for the Northern District of
Texas focused on the right to family integrity and framed the right at issue as a parent's "right to
be free from false allegations of child sexual molestation knowingly made by state investigators
in an effort to remove or retain a child from the parents." Tiemeyer v. Zaika, 947 F. Supp. 1012,
1014 (N.D. Tex. 1996). In Tiemeyer, the plaintiff-father brought a suit under section 1983
claiming that state investigators fabricated and manufactured evidence that the plaintiff had
sexually molested his son to support a court-ordered separation of the plaintiff and his son. Id.
at 1012. Following Fifth Circuit precedent holding that the contours of a parent's substantive
due process liberty interest in the care and custody of his children are not sufficiently defined to
consider the right clearly established, the district court reluctantly dismissed Tiemeyer's claim
with prejudice. Id. at 1013-14. Noting that the Fifth Circuit had declined to expressly declare
such a parental right, the court found it "necessary" to articulate a parent's right to be free from
false allegations of child sexual molestation made by state investigators. Id. at 1014. The court's
reasoning for articulating such a right was that
to continue to deny the claims of parents on the ground that their interest [in family
integrity and harmony] is perennially "nebulous" is to deny them their interest
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CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Devereaux v. Perez has two major
flaws that have serious implications. By requiring too high an intent
standard and by failing to find the violation of a constitutional right
because it defined the due process right at issue in the case too
specifically, the court in Devereaux encourages the use of dubiously
gathered evidence to prosecute suspected child sexual abuse offend-
ers. The court's refusal to protect Devereaux's right not to have
fabricated evidence used against him to deprive him of his liberty
unfortunately has provided a green light to overzealous child abuse
investigators, like the defendants in Devereaux, to use whatever child
interviewing techniques, no matter how outrageous, in order to
concoct cases against wrongly accused people like Devereaux.
In the Preface to the book, 1692 Witch Hunt: The Layman's
Guide to the Salem Witchcraft Trials (1992), George Malcolm Yool
comments:
The terrible things that occurred [between 1692 and 1693] should
serve as a warning to people everywhere. This book shows how
easy it is to come to the wrong conclusions when the whole truth of
a matter is neither sought nor wanted. Our judicial system, though
not perfect, has come a long way since this tragedy, and one can't
help but feel that this black time in American history played a sig-
nificant role in its development. 217
Just like the Salem witchcraft hysteria of 1692 and 1693, Robert
Devereaux's story three centuries later shows "how easy it is to come
to the wrong conclusions when the whole truth of a matter is neither
sought nor wanted. ' '2 1 The outrageous way in which the investigators
in Devereaux interviewed the foster girls and conducted themselves
during the investigation demonstrates that these officials neither
sought nor wanted the whole truth about Robert Devereaux. The
altogether and affords state actors with de facto absolute immunity. Both results are
contrary to the law. Parents do enjoy a liberty interest in the integrity and harmony of
their families.... Moreover, state investigators do not enjoy absolute immunity for
their conduct in making decisions regarding child welfare of the type at issue here....
Part of the reluctance of other courts [to articulate such a parental right] may stem
from the proposition that the interest of the parents must be weighed against the
interest of the state in child safety and welfare. ... However, it is a small step in
drawing the contours of the interests of the parents to rule that the interest includes
freedom from false accusations of child molestation knowingly made by state
officials.... Also, the state's interest in child safety and welfare is not served when an
official knowingly and falsely charges a parent with sexual abuse.
Id. (citations omitted).
217. YOOL, supra note 1. at Preface.
218. Id.
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unfortunate stories of Robert Devereaux and others falsely accused
of child sexual abuse, which are frighteningly similar to the accounts
of the Salem witchcraft hysteria, make one wonder whether the
American judicial system has come such a long way after all since the
tragedy of the Salem witchcraft trials.
